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My deepest thanks to Yirmiyahu Yovel for supervising my dissertation and then helping me to move well beyond it. The manuscript from which this book was built was originally called "A Worm in the Blood." My editor properly pointed out that the title was somewhat nauseating and would probably condemn the book to be shelved in the biology section of bookstores. But please keep in mind that this was the original title and my guiding theme for finding some meaning in Spinoza's method. Many people have helped me with writing this book, only a few of whom I can list. The community of Spinoza scholars is, fittingly, one of the kindest and most thoughtful in academe, and I have benefited greatly from it. Henry Allison, Michael Della Rocca, Shelly Kroll, Justin Steinberg, Amelie Rorty, and Andrew Pyle all read the manuscript in full and provided many helpful comments. Michael, in particular, read two drafts (!), forced me to clarify much murk in the manuscript (although there is much remaining), and gave me countless specific criticisms and corrections from which I benefited enormously. All aided me greatly in turning a draft into a book. The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that any URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate. , 1999-) , establishes texts which supersede Gebhardt, the edition references the standard Gebhardt page numbers. I will use the following standard abbreviations throughout: quotes from the Ethics will be simply referenced by part and number (i.e., "iiip4"). The Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione will be abbreviated TIE and referenced by paragraph number (i.e., "TIE 99").
Abbreviations
Abbreviations employed in the text to refer to Spinoza's other works will be TTP (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus), TP (Tractatus Politicus), PP (Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae), and KV (Korte Verhandeling). All will be referenced by chapter and section numbers and when necessary Gebhardt page (abbreviated by volume and page), except the PP which will be referenced by proposition. Spinoza's letters will be cited in the text as "Letter" followed by a roman numeral number; i.e. Letter 30 will be cited as "Letter XXX." All translations from Spinoza's letters are from, Abraham Wolf (ed. and trans.), The Correspondence of Spinoza (London: Allen and Unwin, 1928),
This is a book about Spinoza, one of the greatest philosophers of the seventeenth century, or of any time. He is also a particularly controversial philosopher and particularly difficult to understand. The controversies primarily stem from the fact that Spinoza's two best-known works, the Ethics and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, contain forceful criticisms of some of the central pillars of revealed religion. As an alternative to revealed religion, Spinoza offered a rigorous and powerful philosophy -most notably a metaphysics that demonstrated the necessity in and eternity of nature and equated nature with God -that, he argued, underlay whatever truths could be found in religion and philosophical theology.
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Consequently, Spinoza was viewed by many of his contemporaries as a dangerous and nearly Satanic figure. Dutch Calvinists, liberal Hobbesians, and many key Enlightened figures of the scientific revolution all united in vigorously attacking the TTP and the Ethics.
2 Furthermore, these attacks 1 Spinoza's main disagreement with his friend Lodewijk Meyer on this issue draws out Spinoza's position on the relation between and distinctness of philosophy and religion. Whereas the Lutheran Meyer (like Maimonides) thought that there was philosophy in Scripture, and that Scripture ought to be understood as expressing the truths of philosophy, Spinoza thought that Scripture contained no philosophy, a few moral truths, and a great deal of history of brutal and primitive desert nomads. Spinoza did not think philosophy could or would replace religion, but rather that the truth of philosophical theology lies in any proximity it bears to the truth of the metaphysics and epistemology that he argues for. The rest is history, politics, and stubborn superstition. Given that one cannot get rid of religion, the problem is how to control it in such a way as to allow for freedom of thoughtsee TTP XX. See also J. Samuel Preus, Spinoza and Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 2 As examples of the attacks on him by contemporaries who differed on many other substantive issues:
the Calvinist Blijenburgh attacked Spinoza in letters and publications, the powerful liberal Hobbesian Lambertus Velthuysen, whose favor Spinoza wished to curry, was horrified by the TTP and wrote a book against it, and the great ideologist of early modern science Robert Boyle both attacked Spinoza in his publications and left a bequest to set up a series of lectures -the Boyle lectures -combating the sort of "atheism" represented by Spinoza.
did not subside with Spinoza's death in 1677, but rather continued for centuries.
3
Spinoza's philosophy was also admired by many free-thinkers and philosophes. 4 In the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century Spinoza even became the secular saint of a kind of mystical pantheist deism for authors like Goethe, Schelling, and Coleridge. In the twentieth century Spinoza has been credited with, among many other things, a founding role in modern empirical psychology, psychoanalysis, Marxism, Nietzscheanism, liberalism, the modern Jewish secular identity, and too many other -isms and -ologies to mention.
This brings up the issue of the difficulties that all readers have understanding Spinoza. A quick look at the very truncated list above of -isms and -ologies with which Spinoza has been credited reveals that there is little that holds them together other than a general agreement on Spinoza's importance. This is a function of the difficulty of Spinoza's texts, so daunting that some of Spinoza's most virulent detractors hardly read his works at all! In the eighteenth century even those who did read Spinoza often relied on popular presentations of his philosophy, most influentially Pierre Bayle's entry "Spinoza" in the Dictionnaire. Accordingly Spinoza has sometimes seemed to function less as a philosopher than as a sort of cipher of Enlightenment aspirations, a Rorschach test through which to read heterodoxy, reason, mysticism, and whatever else one might like.
Who was this philosopher who elicited such responses: contemptuous, devoted, confused, yet persistent and powerful? He was born in 1632 -the same year as John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, and Richard Cumberland (and Defoe's Robinson Crusoe). He belonged to the first generation of philosophers to look back at the anarchic religious war of the late sixteenth and early and mid-seventeenth centuries from a comparatively stable polity periodically erupting in spasms of violence.
5 He was born into the fairly conservative Jewish community of Amsterdam. Amsterdam was one of the most economically, politically, artistically, and intellectually vibrant cities in Europe, although still caught in religious and political struggles which rose and ebbed over the course of Spinoza's brief life.
His father Michael was a merchant. Spinoza worked with him until his death, and then briefly and unsuccessfully attempted to run the family business with his brother. At some point, likely in the early to mid 1650s, Spinoza began to drift away from the Jewish community and into various free-thinking circles centered around Franciscus Van den Enden.
6
Whatever caused him to drift away probably also eventually resulted in his excommunication in 1656, although we cannot be sure.
By 1656 Spinoza had already set a drastically different intellectual course from most of the other Jews of Amsterdam.
7 But expulsion from the Jewish community meant an inability to communicate and thus to financially interact with other Jews. Consequently, Spinoza had to pursue a different means of making a living, and so he became a lens grinder. We have a tendency sometimes to view early modern science through the writings of the great theorists, but it was an intellectual world centered on observation, scientific instruments, and experiments. Spinoza was respected for the quality and precision of his lenses, and the excellence of his work placed him within the experimental circles at the cutting edge of early modern science, even if he was far more notorious -from the early 1660s onwardfor his heterodox teachings and works.
I consider relevant details of Spinoza's biography over the course of this book. But rather than give more of the particular details of Spinoza's life I will provide a broad sense of Spinoza's intellectual milieu. The spheres in which Spinoza circulated were unusual for an early modern philosopher, although the Dutch rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel (who was perhaps one of Spinoza's teachers) engaged with a similar variety of intellectual circles, as did a few others. I would like quickly to sketch the variety of these intellectual and social spheres by considering a contingent fact about Spinoza: his first name and the many languages into which it was rendered. Through this device we can get a synoptic view of the many milieus through and in which he circulated. In Latin Spinoza's name was Benedictus or Benedict. Latin was the language of most of Spinoza's philosophical writings and correspondence. It was the common language of European intellectuals that bridged their many linguistic and political rifts. It was the language of erudition and learning, the language in which Spinoza and the students of Franciscus Van den Enden performed Roman dramas, including works by Spinoza's beloved Terence. It was the language of Spinoza's major ancient influences: Seneca, Tacitus, Cicero, and Lucretius. Spinoza used Latin to communicate with intellectuals like Leibniz, Huygens, Oldenburg, Tschirnhaus, and many others. Latin was the language of science and thus was integral to his economic pursuits. Latin is the main language through which we know Spinoza the philosopher.
In Hebrew, Spinoza's first name was Baruch. It was the language of Scripture and religious observance in the community in which he was raised.
9 Hebrew was the religious language of the community he was eventually excommunicated from, and the language of the theologians he coolly criticized in the TTP. Spinoza knew the language intimately and even wrote a Hebrew grammar (although he probably wrote it for the use of radical Gentiles in understanding Scripture as a historical document).
Spinoza's first name in Portuguese was Bento. Portuguese was the language of his home and family, the language of the country from which his family had emigrated to Amsterdam. It was also the workaday language of the Jewish community that he grew up in and of the business he shared with his brother upon his father's death: "Bento y Gabriel d'Espinosa."
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This language was, like Hebrew, intertwined with his Jewish roots. In the TTP Spinoza notes that, since the King of Spain granted civic rights and privileges to Spanish Jews who had been forced to convert to Christianity, the converso families quickly forgot their identity. But, as the King of Portugal denied the Portuguese Jews any social or political status, they held fast to the Judaism that had been taken away from them even after their forced conversion. Why not? For, despite their professions of Christian faith, they were still treated like Jews (TTP iii, iii/42). The Portuguese community in which Spinoza grew up, with its traditional culture and languages and insular nature, was likely viewed by Spinoza the philosopher as pathological. At the same time Portuguese, and Spanish, clearly always had an appeal for Spinoza, and he owned a number of literary works including the novels of Cervantes. Portuguese was literally his mother tongue, the language of his mother Hanna and probably the language of his lullabies.
Spinoza, of course, spoke a fourth language: Dutch. Dutch was the language of everyday life once he left the Jewish community, the language of his discussion circles, and the language of politics. It was also the language of important Dutch radical texts like his friend Adriaan Koerbagh's Een Blomhofvan allerley Lieflijkheyd sonder verdriet, influential political works like Pieter De La Court's Politike Discoursen, as well as religious polemics like William van Blijenburgh's De waerheyt van de christelijcke godst-dienst (against Spinoza). One of Spinoza's works, the KV , has been handed down to us in Dutch, although it was probably translated from a lost Latin original. Spinoza's Opera Posthuma was translated into Dutch immediately upon his death as De Nagelate Schriften (CW x), showing that Spinoza's circle wished to expand his philosophy from highbrow Latin to the more colloquial but extraordinarily intellectually rich Dutch language.
Benedict, Baruch, and Bento all mean the same thing, blessed or blessing. Spinoza's goal in his most important work, the Ethics, was to lead readers, who were capable, to their own blessedness, or more accurately to help them lead themselves. In his writings Spinoza used the Latin word "beatitudo" for blessedness (wisely he did not use his own name), which he described as "our greatest happiness" consisting "in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love and morality advise" (ii49s). But the many translations of his name and many words for blessedness point toward the difficulty intrinsic to his undertaking. Spinoza straddled numerous communities with different cultures and needs and had many influences arising from his engagements with these different communities. How to show those who were capable the way to blessedness? How to help them to recognize their power and to understand God and nature? How to show them that the desire for blessedness underlaid their many tongues, and their many ways of speaking, even when they did not know this? How to show them that blessedness arose from understanding the metaphysical underpinnings of an apparently chaotic world, underpinnings which showed much that we take for granted to be either false or so many expressions of a unified God or nature? And, not the least, how to show that which he wished to show them was true? Spinoza tried numerous tactics to get these points across in his different works, but the Ethics is clearly his ultimate statement on blessedness.
11 To this end, Spinoza employed a particular method, different from many of the other ways in which he had presented his philosophy over the course of his intellectual career. This book is concerned with exploring Spinoza's method, and seeing how the method bears on and is related to the goals of the Ethics. "i n m o re g e o m e t r i c o " -spinoz a's geometrical method Philosophical interest in method, interest in the best way to access and to express truths about morals, God, nature, mathematics, and reality as such, is as old as philosophy itself. This is not surprising. If all men, or at least all philosophically disposed men, desire to know, some obvious questions arise quite immediately and naturally: "Can we know at all?" "If we can, what can we know?" "What is the best way to know and to access the most important truths?" These have not turned out to be the easiest philosophical questions, but they are some of the most fruitful, witness Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics, Descartes' Discourse on Method , Locke's Essay, Hume's Treatise, and many other of the greatest works of philosophy ancient, modern, and contemporary.
A number of recent works in the history of philosophy have emphasized that many disparate sorts of philosophers -from Plato, Plotinus, and the Stoics to Locke, Hume, and Smith to Wittgenstein -share the idea that the purpose of a philosophical method is not just to offer a series of valid propositions or claims, but rather in some way to transform or change readers, to allow them to look at themselves in the world in a different way. What this different way is varies from philosopher to philosopher, but one constant is that a method must be constructed in such a manner as to allow readers to see the ways that the philosophy impacts them and their lives, and to learn to look at the world from a different perspective than they might otherwise.
The issue of the transformative purpose of method is interrelated with the questions of whether we can know, what we can know, and how best to know. Many of the best-known philosophers prior to the twentieth century were not primarily interested in providing ingenious arguments in response to outstanding problems or questions, but wanted to change readers, dialogue partners, or listeners, or to allow them to change themselves, in such a way that they might become happier and wiser. Philosophy was not only viewed in terms of the solving of problems, but was also considered worth pursuing insofar as it was edifying and therapeutic; and these two goals clearly ought not be mutually exclusive. Clarifying a philosophical problem or better understanding an important issue are also sorts of selfclarification, clearing up our heads and making us think a little straighter. This sort of procedure of clarification also might make us happy and wise, or at least not so sad and stupid.
Much of what I will say about Spinoza in the following chapters will respond to and follow from this basic point: that Spinoza's philosophy is a kind of self-clarificatory therapy for those capable of self-clarification; that this self-clarification arises not just from reflection but also from other sorts of knowing; and finally that the choice of the method by which to establish appropriate knowledge and the vehicle or means by which to present it, as a consequence, is absolutely central. Now I hope you are thinking: "That is an interesting, if somewhat fuzzy, way of presenting Spinoza and some of the motivations for his philosophy. But I have looked a bit at the Ethics, and no work of philosophy seems more ill-suited for such therapy. Spinoza's Ethics is an exemplar of a sort of philosophical formalism that places validity of argument far above the needs of the reader. The Ethics is a geometrical method, a philosophy bound by the laws of mathematical deduction. If this is a philosophical therapy, it seems to be a philosophical analogue of the Polar Bear's Club -the best therapy is to jump into freezing cold water, only in this case into the iciest and least human reaches of reason." This is a fair objection. I will try to respond to it in the chapters that follow, but first we need to know something about Spinoza's method and its historical context. In the Ethics Spinoza derived a sequence of numbered propositions from definitions and axioms -much as Euclid did in the Elements -building each link in the expanding chain on the definitions, axioms, and propositions prior to it. Euclid derived the celebrated Proposition 47 of Book I of the Elements -the claim that "in right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle" -from prior and apparently far more obvious propositions about parallelograms (i.41) and angles (i.14).
12 In a
